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1. INTRODUCTION
The purpoae here is aimply atated: It ia to weaken the requirement for eriatence of
Naeh equilibrium in mixed atrategiee that payoff functiona be oontinuoue in pure atrategy
veCtOre. (Thfe fe Iequfred, for example, by Glickaburg, 1952.) The weaker requirement
adopted here ia that each player's payoff is upper aemicontinuoue in the vector of all pure
atrategy choicea, and continuoua in the vector of all other playera' atrategiea, for each own
choice. All pure atrategy aete are taken to be compact as uaual. A minor point ie that
theae atrategy aete are taken to be aubaeta of inetric apacee rather than juat of Hauedorff
apacea, aa in Glickabnrg.
The following related result ehould be noted. Daagupta and Maskin (1988, p. 4,
Theorem 2) diacuse the euetence of Nash equilibrium in pun atrategiea under weaker
continuity asaumptiona than thoae here. (It ia easy to aee that requiring payoffa to be
continuoue in the vector of other playera' pure choicee impliee "graph continuity".)
However, they aleo reqnire payoffa to be quaeiconcave in own pure atrategiee, which ia not
required here. Snppoae one were to attempt to apply the Dasgupta and Masldn reault to
mixed atrategies as in the preaent context. It is trivial that quasiooncavity in own atrategy
obtaina when mixed atrategies are permitted. The difficulty ia to ahow that the weakened
continnity propertiea in pure atrategies carry over to preciaely analogoue atatementa for
mized atrategies. This ia esaeatially the contribution of the preaent note, although the
proof reliea directly on Glickaburg (1952).
2. ECONOMIC MOTIVATION
The intention here ia to ahow that it easy to conatruct economic modela in which the
weakened continnity requirement ie all that can be gnaranteed.
Conaider indeed Conrnot dnopoly, given in normal form as
G-((Qi~ xi) ~ i-1, 2)2
where Qi, i-1, 2 are compact aubseta of R} and
ai:QyR,fori-1,2,8ivenQ-Q1"Q2
are continuous functiona. Define aeta of mixed strategiea ae naual by
Mi -{probability measures on Borel anbsets of Qi}
and expected profits ae, say,
~i:M1.M2 y R, ri(ml~m2) - r~i(ql~ 92)~1(ql)~(q2)~ for mi E Mi, i- 1, 2.
It follows from Glickaburg (1952) that a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, defined in
the nsual way, must exiat. (Novshek, 1980, however, asserta that a Nash equilibrium in
pnre atrategiea, a Cournot equilibrium, that ie, need not euat in theae circumstances.)
Consider now the following Stackelberg version of this dnopoly. Suppose that 5rm 1
ia the leader, moving before firm 2. Firm 2 moves next given knowledge of 1's choice. This
game of perfect information has a"subgame perfect equilibrium" in pure strategiea. (See
Selten, 1975, for the definition of a aubgame perfect equilibrium, or SPE, in a finite game.
Hellwig, et d, 1989, extend this to "continuoua action" games.) Indeed the force of
subgame perfectneea ia that 2's choice of quantity, f2(ql), say, given any previous choice by
firm 1 of ql satisfy
~(ql) E~(ql) -{q2~ x2(q1,92) ?~2(91~q2') for all q2' E Q2}, for all 91 E Ql~
where R2 is nonempty and upper hemicontinuoue given that Q1 and Q2 are compact and
~r2 ia continuoue. (See Berge, 1983, p. 118.) If 2 breaka ties in 1'e favor, eo
í2(ql) E arg max rl(ql, 92)
q2ER2 (ql)
then firm 1'a mazimization problem must have a eolution. (Hellwig, et al, 1989, d18CU88
thia ieaue of tie-breaking for general gamea with perfect information.) This completea the
apecification of a Stackelberg eqnilibrium in pure strategiea.
It aeems natural to consider the following generaliaatioa of both the Cournot
aimultaneoua move game and the Stackelberg aequential move game. Suppose that, prior
to either firm'a choice, aature chooea atate "0", with probability 1-E, and atate "1" with
pmbabílity E. Firm 1 next chooaea ql in ignorance of the atate of nature. Ia atate "0",3
firm 2 then chooses ia ignorance of 1's choice, as in the Cournot game. In state "1",
however, firm 2 is informed of 1's choice, as in the Stackelberg version of the game. The
question is then whether there e~rists an SPE of this extended game.
Suppose that firm 2 again breaks ties in favor offirm 1 in state "1". Indeed,
snppose that firm 2's strategy in state "1" ia still denoted by f2, as in the Stackelberg
model and that the best reply correspondence R,~ is also ae defined above. It follows that
1's payoff in state "1",
~(qi) - ~1(qi,~(ql)) - max xl(qi, q2)
q2 E ~(91)
say, ie upper semicoatinnous in ql. (See Berge, p. 116, Theorem 2.) In addition, 2's payoff
in state "1",
~(ql) - ~2(ql,~(ql)) - ma: ~r2(ql~q2),
q2EQ2
say, is continuous in qi. (See Berge, 1963, p. 118, "Maumum Theorem".) Hence the
overall expected payoffs can then be expressed as, say,
nl(ql,q2) - e~(qi) f(i-E)~1(ql,q2) and n2(ql,q2) - E~(qi) f(1-e)~2(ql,q2),
where IIi is npper semicontinuous in (ql,q2) and oontinuous in q2, and where n2 is
continuous in (qi,q2). It is then suffiáent for existence of an SPE of the original extended
game that there eust a Nash equilibrium for this "reduced form" game. Given
oonnterexamples to ezistence of Cournot eqnilibrium in pure strategies, it follows that pure
strategies will not sufSce generally for eristence here either. Eueteace of a Nash
eqnilibrium in mixed etrategiea for the "reduced form" game is ensured by the reeult of the
nact section. (Robson, 1990, also makes nse of the present result to develop a refinement
of Naeh equilibrium for two-person nonzero~um games. This is based on slight
uncertainty ooncerning the order of moves.)
3. THE RESULT
The following equivalent definitions are recalled. (See Berge, 1983, pp. 74-77.)4
Dej'initioA 1: Upper Stntfcontinuífy
Conaider a function
U: SyR
where S is a metric apace. U is "upper aemicontinuoue", or "u.s.c." for ahort, iff any of the
following equivalent conditiona hold
(a) If an ~ s, n ~ m, then dó ~ 0 3N 3 n~ lv impliea U(sn) ~ U(a) -1- b
(b) If sn -~ e, n y m, then lim aupn U(an) ~ U(s).
(c) The upper contour aeta {s E S ~ U(s) ~ fJ} are cloaed for all ~? E R.
The following class of gamea ia conaidered.
Defiaition t: Game, G
An N-peraon nonzero aum game is given as
G - ((Si~ Ui)~ i - I,...,N)
where Si are compact metric apacea, and the Ui are functiona
Ui: S i R}, i-1,...,N, where S- S1 ti...x SN,
anch that
(i) Ui ia u.e.c. on S, i-1,...,N. This impliea that each Ui is bounded above (see Berge,
p. 76). For convenience, each Ui is asaumed nonnegative.
(ii) Ui 18 COntlnu0II8 ln 8~, for all ai, where a~ ie the vector (81,...,BN) with si deleted,
i - 1,...,N.
The following atrategy sete are conaidered.
Definítion J: Mixed Strategiea
A mixed etrategy mi for player i is a probability meaeure on the aet of Bore1 aeta of
Si. The aet of all such probability meaeurea is denoted Mi, i-1,...,N. The payoff to player
i ie, aay,
Vi(ml,...,mN) - J
Uidm, where m- ml .....mN,5
ia the uniqne product measure induced on S by m1,...,mN. Each Ui ia measurable aince it
ia n.e.c., and aince it is also bounded, it is integrable.
The seta of mized atrategies are given the following topology.
Defenítion .(: Wia~ Coavergeace
Suppoae {mn}á-1 and m belong to M, the aet of probability meaenres on the Borel
aets of some compact metric apace S. Thea "mn weakly convergea to m", written
mn~m iff Jfdmn~ Jfdm
for all real-valued continuoua functions f on S. (See Billingaley, 1988, p. 7.) Thie topology
ia conaiatent with the "Prohorov" metric (Billingaley, pp. 237-238.)
The following three preliminary results are needed to prove the theorem.
Lemma 1: Limit ofProduet is Product ofLimita
Suppose that
mn~mi, nym
where mn, mi E Mi for the compact metric spacea Si, i-1,...,N. It followa that
mn - mi .....mN ~ ml .....mN - m
where mn, and m are the unique product probability measurea on the Borel aeta of the
compact metric apace S induced by mn and mi, i- 1,...,N.
PtooF Consider the firatly the case N- 2. Suppoae then
f: Sl x S2 -~ R
ia any continuoua function, which ia then clearly bonnded and integrable. It muat be
ahown that
J fdmn ~ f fdm8
Uaing Fnbini'e Theorem (Bartle, 1968, pp. 119-120) thia ia equivalent to ahowing that
f (,~ f~l)~2 ~ J (J f~l)~2
ae n-~ m. Define thea
Fn(a2) - J f(sl,s2)dmi(el) and F(e2) - J f(al,e2)dml(el)
which are coatinnons fnnctione, given that f ia continuoue and bounded, nsing the Lebeague
Dominated Convergence Theorem (Bartle, p. 44). By the weak convergence of mi,
F'n(s2) ~ F(e2) Va2 E S2.
Fnrthermore, {Fn} ie equicontinuow. Indeed, aince f ia continuoue on the compact Sl . S2,
~Íó ~ 0 3 E~ 0 3 d2(BZ,82) C E~ I'lalra2) -'`elra2) ~ G ó, V elESl, d a2, a2ES2
where d2 ia the metric on S2. Hence
I F'n(e2) - Fa(e2) ~ c fI f(el,s2) - f(el,e2) ~ dmi(sl) c á for all n.
Clearly the {F`n} are alao pointwiae bounded. It followa that
Fa(82) -~ F(g2)
uniformly on S2 (eee Rndin, 1984, p. 158). Hence V6 ~ 0 3 Nl 3 n 1 Nl impliea
~ Fn(82) - F(82) I G~, V e2 E S2
which implies, in tnrn,
IJ~(82)dm2(82)-J F(82)~2(a2) I ~~
In addition, weat convergence of m2 to m2 impliea:
3N2 3 n 1 N2 impliea
J F(82)~2(a2) - f F(82)~(g2)I ~ l7
Hence n~ Maz{Nl, N2} impliea the result for N- 2:
~ J Fs`dm2 - f Fdm2~ c ~ I Fndm2 - J Fdm2 ~.} ~ f Fdm2 - f Fdm2~ G á.
The result for general N now follows by induction, naing the associativity of the product
operation for measurea. (See Friedman, 1982, p. 87.)
Notc A atronger version of the above result for N- 2 can be found in Parthasarathy
(1967, p. 57, Lemma 1.1). The proof, however, is leas direct than that given here.
Lemma t: Inheriting U.S.C.
Consider the u.s.c. functioa
U: S ~ R}
where S ie a compact metric space. Suppose {mn}a-1, m E M, the set of probability
meaeures on Borel aeta of S, aad mn ~ m. It follows that f Udm ia u.s.c. in m:
lim aupn J iJdmn c~ Udm.
PaooF Billingaley (1988, pp. 12-13, Theorem 2.1) proves the equivalence of five
conditions characterizing weak wavergence. Part of hia proof yields the reqnired reault,
althongh this is not explicit. For completeness, the proof is aa follows.
Withont lass of generality, it ie asaumed that
OGU(s)G1 VaES.
For fized k E N, define
Fi -{s ~ U(s) ) F} i-0,...,k
which are closed precisely because U is n.a.c. (Billingaley asaumea U is continuoua and uaes
the following argument on both U and -U.)
All the Fi are meaeurable seta, U is a measurable function, and it followe that
S~ m{e ~~ c U(s) G F} t j Udm t E F m{e~~ c U(e) G É}
i-1 i-18
Thue
E~m(Fi-1) - m(Fi)) 5 j Udm ~ E~{m(Fi-1) - m(Fi)).
i-1 i-1
The two suma can be simplified to yield
F E m(Fi) c f Udm c F f F É m(Fi).
i-1 .1 i-1
Billingaley showa that
mn ~ m iff lim aupm m~(F) ( m(F) for all closed aete F.




Udmn ( F-} F E m(Fi) ~ F f f Udm
i-1 J
and, aince k is arbitrary,
lim supnJ
Udmn c~ Udm Q.E.D.
Lemma 8: Inheritmg Continsity
Suppoae that Ui and Vi, 1,...,N, are as in Definitiona 1, 2 and 3. Then Vi(mi,m~),
where m~ denotea the vector (ml,...,mn) with mi deleted, ia continuoue in m~ in that:
mi ~ m~ impliea Vi(mi,mi) ~ Vi(mi,m~), VmiEMi, Vm~, mi E M~
where M~ is the Carteaian product of M1,...,MN with Mi omitted and where weak
convergence is as ia DeSnition 4.
P~ooF DeSne
vi(mi,e~) - J Ui(Si,ei)dmi(ei)
Th18 18 a COIItlnllon8 Íunctl0n O{ 8~, for any mi E Mi, given Ui(ai,e~) is continnous in e~




vi(mi,s~)d{ II mn(a.)} -~ Vi(mi, m.~)
J~i J J
ae m~ ~ mi, nsing Lemma 1.
Finally, a Nash eqnilibrium ia defined in the obvioua faahion:
Ikfinition 5: Nasé~ Equilibrstim
A Nash equilibrinm in mixed atrategiea for the game deacribed in Definitione 1, 2,
and 3 ia
s s
(m1,...,mN) E M1 .....MN
auch that
r r s
Vi(mi, mi) ) Vi(mi, mj) Vmi E Mi, for i - 1,...,N.
The main result ie then
Táeorem 1: FJsistence ojNE
Any game G, ae ia Definitions i, 2, and 3 has a Nash equilibrium as in Definition 5.
PtooF Defiae the best-reply correepondencea
Ri: M-i --~ Mi
Ri(m~) -{mi E Mi ~ Vi(mi, mj) ) Vi(mi, m~) Vm~ E Mi}, i- 1,...,N
In order to apply the generalization of Kakutani's theorem due to Glickaburg
(1952, p. 171, "Theorem"), note the following:
(i) C(Si), the continnona functions on the compact metric apace, Si, ia a Banach apace.
~
(ii) C(Si) , the linear fnnctionala on C(Si) ia a conve.x Hauadorff lineaz topological space.
~
(iii) Mi, the probability meaaurea on Borel aeta of Si, is a convex compact aubaet of C(Si) .
r
Note that (i), (ii) and (iii) are as in Glickaburg. He refera to the "m topology" that ie, the
s
"weak topology" bnt thia ia identical to the "topology of weak convergeace" as defined by
Billingaley. ( 1968, p. 238.)10
(iv) Each Ri ie convex valued, given the nse of mixed atrategiee and ezpected payoffa.
Thna, for example, if t E(0,1) mi, mi E Ri(m~) then
tmi f (1-t)m~ E Ri(m~).
Also, Ri ia nonempty. Thie follows immediately from Lemma 2, eince
n.s.c.functiona attain a maximum on a compact aet. (See, for ezample, Berge, p. 76,
Theorem 2.)
(v) The heart of the matter is to ahow that each Ri haa a closed graph. That ie, auppoae
m~ W. m~, mn E Ri(m~) ~ mi. (Since Mi are metrisable, i-1,2, they are firat conntable
and the usual sequencea characterize the topology. See Dugund,p, 1966, pp. 188-187,
pp. 217-218. There ie a more general characterization in Glickaburg.) It muat then be
ahown that mi E Ri(m~). Suppoae not. Then there e~riata m~ E Mi auch that
Vi(mi ~ m~) - Vi(mi~ m~) - 3~ 1 0.
Now Lemmae 1 and 2 imply that
mn-mn.m~~mi.mi-m
and there exiats an N1 auch that n ~ Nl impliea
Vi(mn, m~) ~ Vi(mi, m~) f ~
Also, Lemma 3 implies there is an N2 auch that
n~ N2 implies I Vi(mi, mi) - Vi(mi, m.i) ~~ ~.
Hence n 1 Max{N1,N2} impliee
Vi(m~,mi) - Vi(mn,m~) -
~Vi(m; ,m~)-Vi(mi ~m~)l~~Vi(m;,mi)-Vi(~rm~)~}LVi(mirm j~Vi(mn~mj)~
~-Ot3~-G-~~O
Thia contradicta
mn E Ri(mi). Q.E.D.11
Remark It might be that the contiauity assumptions here can be further relaxed.
Note, indeed, that Berge (1983, pp. 211~211) presents a resnlt due to Sion of an euetence
theorem for a two-person aero sum game for which each player's payoff is n.s.c. (and
qnaeiconcave) in hie own choice and l.s.c. (and quasiconvez) in the other. The present
result imposes stronger coaditiona on Vl and V2 considered as functioae of (ml,m2), give.n
that V2 --Vl; indeed they must then be continuoue in (ml,m2).12
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